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ABSTRACT 
Fara Azmat a, Ken Coghill and Quamrul Alam 
Department of Management, Monash university 
a E-mail: fara.azmaf@buseco.monashedu.au 
In the quest for 'good governance', the developing countries have embarked on ambitious NPM 
style market-oriented reform policies mainly advocated by international development agencies 
(IDA) over the last two decades. Bangladesh has been pursuing decades of market-oriented 
reforms advocated by IDAs with the prime objectives of achieving an efficient, cost effective 
service delivery through increased involvement of the private sector. The shift towards 
marketisation has led to a complex, horizontal and networked structure of partnerships between 
state and non state actors. The private sector and NOOs are now delivering goods and services 
which were once the exclusive domain of the state. These changes have however, not been 
associated with changes in institutional arrangements, safeguards and regulation required to 
support the private sector led development, which is not sustained independently of the context 
in which it operates. Using the agriculture input sector as an exemplar, this paper explores the 
constraints of sustainable private sector led development. The paper argues that the main 
impediment to private sector led development in this sector centre on lack of good governance. 
In addition, lack of an integrated market structure, market information, capacity and awareness 
building are other factors that are inhibiting the private sector led development. We argue that a 
functional governance model is required in Bangladesh that engages the state, civil society and 
the private sector to work effectively in a participatory approach to deal with the constraints of 
private sector led development and for improving good governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Good governance has been an agenda advocating pro-market reforms i.e. redirecting the role 
of the state from 'rowing' to 'steering' and including private sector and non governmental 
organizations (NGOs) as various forms of partnership in public governance (Brinkerhoff, 
2003). As a result, the traditional notion of governance has changed from being synonymous 
with government to encompass the integration of public, private and civil society 
organizations (Azmat and Coghill, 2005). The outcome of the market-based reforms in the 
developing countries imposed by external aid agencies mainly the World Bank and the IMP 
through their structural adjustment programs linked with conditionality has been mixed and 
ranges from considerable success to disappointment (World Bank, 2002). In developing 
countries the term 'good governance' has emerged in response to the concerns over aid 
ineffectiveness and the pervasive effects of corruption and is increasingly used among the 
donors as both objective and a condition of the development assistance strategy (Santiso, 
2003). 
As the state is popularly viewed as having a major responsibility for socioeconomic 
development in the South Asian countries, UN Report, 2001 argues that the western approach 
for a leaner, meaner and market friendly state in South Asian countries may be given lip 
service: the state apparatus has not been downsized and emaciated as happened in parts of the 
West (United Nations, 2001). Bangladesh has been pursuing decades of market-oriented 
reforms, suppOlted by IDAs with the prime objectives of achieving an efficient, cost effective 
service delivery through the increased involvement of the private sector. In implementing the 
market oriented approach, the external pressure played a more significant role than self 
propelling activities of market forces and the power of the rationality of the market. This 
paper assesses the private sector led development in Bangladesh as a result of the market-
based reforms which have been ongoing for about three decades. Agriculture sector is 
particularly interesting to analyse as it is one of the impOltant sector of the economy and has 
also experienced pervasive reforms in input distribution side. The agricultural input sector 
which is predominantly associated with the farmers most of whom are poor, marginalized and 
not literate enough, provides an extreme case of difficulties associated with the 
implementation of reforms due to the presence of . anti-market bias. The utilization of the 
agriculture sector is therefore a useful basis for examining and highlighting the constraints of 
the private sector led development in other sectors as well. 
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This paper draws upon the findings of an exploratory stud/ conducted by one of the authors 
during 2003-2004 investigating the perception of the key stakeholders regarding the ability of the 
market-based reforms undertaken in the agriculture input sector to achieve the expected 
outcomes. The findings of this study are used in this paper to explore the constraints of private 
sector led development in this sector. 
The paper commences with a brief account of the agriculture sector and the market-based 
reforms that have changed the state dominated agricultural input management system to a 
hybrid system followed by a review of the impact of the reforms highlighting the problems. 
The second section identifies and discusses the main constraints of private sector led 
development in this sector. Section three proposes the conceptual integrated governance model 
based on the identified problems and a discussion on how the model can overcome the 
problems faced in the input sector. 
CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE IN AGRICULTURE SECTOR: PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
MARKET-BASED REFORMS 
As common with other developing countries Bangladesh has a large population, low per capita 
income, and an agrarian economy. Agriculture sector is vital not only for overall economic 
development and food security, but also for stable social and political conditions. Although the 
share of agriculture in GDP is gradually declining (40% in the 70s), agriculture still plays a 
very important role in the economic growth of the country in terms of its contribution to GDP 
(23 % in 2003), foreign earnings (10%), employment (63%) and is also related to the 
development of other sectors of the country through the supply of raw materials and demand 
linkages (Ministry of Finance, 2003). 
Bangladesh has increasingly moved towards a market-based economy since the mid 1970s as 
a result of implementing structural adjustment programs, introducing macroeconomic reforms 
and privati sing state owned enterprises with direct support from the World Bank and the IMF. 
1 The exploratory study had both quantitative and qualitative components investigating 
the perception of the key stakeholders on the performance of market-based reforms in 
agriculture input sector. A total of 154 surveys were conducted with public officials, 
private entrepreneurs and farmers. 16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
donor agencies and the senior bureaucrats involved with the reform poliCies. 
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The reforms have been most pervasive in the agricultural input sector resulting in a shift away 
from a state dominated system to a networked system. Until the agricultural reforms that 
started in the late 1970s, the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC), a 
state agency with branches all over the country- had the monopoly of sales and distribution of 
agricultural inputs i.e. fertilizer, irrigation equipments, pesticides, and seeds to farmers. By the 
early 1990s, agricultural input delivery services had been privatized and these inputs are now 
being delivered to the farmers through a network of private sector dealers and in some case 
NGOs (Ahmed, Haggblade and Chowdhury, 2000). The reform policies involved reductions in 
subsidies and increased private sector involvement in sales and distribution of agricultural 
inputs through liberalization, deregulation and privatization. 
Review of the Reform Measures 
The reforms were undertaken with the aim to increase efficiency of the input delivery system, 
increase access by farmers to inputs at a reasonable price, to allow increased involvement of 
the private sector, increase food production and decrease the budgetary burden of subsidy. It 
was expected that these benefits would 'trickle down' and lead to improved food security, 
crop sector profitability and socioeconomic conditions of the farmers. 
As a result of the reforms, a new management structure has evolved with multiple actors who 
operate in a complex and networked structure of partnerships. The private sector and NGOs 
are now delivering agricultural inputs i.e. fertilizers, seeds, pesticides and irrigation equipment 
which were once the exclusive domain of the state. The reforms in the agriculture input sector 
have been successful to some extent in creating: the necessary platform of a market in which 
non state actors are playing a productive role and reducing the burden of the state; the concept 
of market in terms of creating some awareness among people to view the market as alternative 
service delivery mechanism; institutional changes; distribution networks; and the necessary 
infrastructure (Azmat and Coghill, 2005). Despite the changes in inbound input distribution 
side of governance structure, there have not been enough changes in outbound demand 
system, institutional arrangements, safeguards and regulation to support the private sector led 
development as discussed later. 
While the research institutes i.e. Bangladesh Agriculture Research Institute (BARI), 
Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI) have contributed to increasing agricultural 
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production by releasing high yielding varieties, the reforms in this sector also had a significant 
impact in increasing agricultural performance and productivity. Despite flooding and the 
natural calamities, which are a regular phenomenon adversely affecting agricultural 
production, Bangladesh has been successful in achieving self- sufficiency in food grain 
production in a span of less than three decades. Ahmed (1995 ) argues that without the market 
reforms, the country would have reverted to the historical situation of regular food crisis and 
high prices. The increased agricultural production has also led to improved food security 
conditions. The reforms have also led to the gradual withdrawal of subsidy and easy access to 
agricultural inputs. 
Although agricultural production and food security conditions have improved, studies have 
found that there has been no significant impact on socioeconomic conditions of the 'very poor' 
farmers (Bhattacharya and Titumir, 2001). This has been due to both lower prices for 
agricultural produce and the rise in the cost of agricultural production due to increased prices 
of agricultural inputs. The situation is made worse by the recent trend of sale of contaminated 
underweight inputs. Private suppliers do not accept responsibility for the social impact of their 
actions i.e. they demonstrate low levels of corporate social responsibility by selling low 
quality, underweight inputs2. These poor quality inputs decrease the yields, affect the micro-
nutrient component of the soil, adversely affecting the health of the soil and its productivity, 
leading to loss of soil fertility and biodiversity (SAPRIN, 2002:124). This is not only having a 
significant adverse impact on agricultural yields, it is also creating a relationship of distrust 
between the farmers and the traders. This might be one of the reasons that even after decades 
of market- based reforms the private sector has not been able to earn the public trust which is 
evident through the prevailing anti-market bias3 in this sector. Low levels of Corporate Social 
2 The results of the exploratory study have reported that the quality of the inputs , providing 
underweight and sale of the inputs sometimes at higher prices have been a problem. A large 
number of farmers (63.2%) think that the quality of the inputs is not of a higher quality 
compared to the previous state administered system. Recently, the sale of contaminated 
agricultural inputs has become quite common in Bangladesh. There are reports in local 
newspapers that dealers were selling contaminated agricultural inputs i.e. fertilizer mixed with 
cement granules, low quality seeds and pesticides. (The Independent, 14-2-04). In addition, the 
incidence of providing less weight is not only common for agricultural inputs but almost in all the 
commodities 
3 According to the findings of the study, a majority of the participants supported the involvement 
of state in all the activities i.e. regulation, extension, providing information and research in 
agriculture sector. 
5 
Responsibility (CSR) practised by suppliers, leading to the sale of the contaminated 
agricultural inputs, are among the major problems faced by the agricultural input market in 
Bangladesh and the underlying reasons for this problem mainly centre on governance issues. 
In addition, lack of market information by the farmers on price trends, the poorly developed 
transport system, the existence of middlemen who help the farmers to sell their produces but 
also exploit both the farmers and the buyers by profiteering and the lack of awareness among 
the farmers of their rights are other factors that are creating an unfavourable system for the 
farmers, preventing them from realizing the benefits of increased production. 
CONSTRAINTS OF Pruv ATE SECTOR LED DEVELOPMENT 
According to UN Report ( 2001), in most of the cases the retreat of state from the social area 
and the weakening of the state institutes have not allowed people to benefit mainly due to 
lack of a stable and suitable environment (UN Report, 2001). There is growing evidence 
about the positive relationship between stable and credible business environment and the 
performance of the reform policies. Brunetti, Kisunko and Wedel' (1998) argue that a 
business environment with "incredible" rules such as unclear property rights, policy surprises 
and reversals, uncertain contract enforcement and high corruption leads to lower investment 
and growth. A stable and credible business environment is very much related with good 
governance. 
Lack of good governance has been an endemic problem in Bangladesh having far reaching 
adverse effect on every sector of the economy including agriculture sector. The six indicators 
recognized as the most effective measurement tools of 'good governance' across the world 
are voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Lobaton, 2003). Table-1 shows the relative position of Bangladesh in terms of its good 
governance indicators among other countries of the region where Bangladesh ranks lowest in 
all the indicators except Voice and accountability and Political Stability. 
Table: 1: Governance Indicators 2002: Selected Countries in the Asian Region( Percentiles 
rank) 
Voice Government Regulatory Control of 
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accountability Stability effecti veness Quality of COlTUption 
law 
Singapore 65.7 91.9 100.0 99.5 93.3 99.5 
Malaysia 42.4 61.6 80.9 68.6 69.6 68.0 
Thailand 57.1 62.7 64.9 65.5 62.4 53.6 
Sri Lanka 48.0 20.5 59.8 58.8 60.8 54.6 
Vietnam 10.6 61.1 48.5 25.3 44.8 33.0 
Bangladesh 29.3 26.5 35.1 13.9 26.3 7.7 
Source: Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi, (2003). 
Although the reforms have facilitated the increased food grain production, reduced subsidy 
and increased access to inputs by farmers, findings of this study suggest that, the following 
market failures are inhibiting the private sector led development in this sector following the 
reforms: 
o Lack of good governance as measured by control of corruption, regulatory 
quality and rule of law are the main factors contributing to the problems of low 
level of CSR in this sector. The issues of CSR related with the sale of low 
quality, underweight inputs sometimes at higher prices with occasional artificial 
crisis has emerged as a major problem threatening the success and sustainability 
of private sector led development in this sector. 
o The reforms have not been able to create an integrated market structure as they 
were one-sided and focused only on supply side factors without considering all 
the market forces. 
o Lack of access to adequate market information, institutional capacities and lack 
of awareness among the traders and the farmers of responsible business practices 
and rights respectively are hindering the development of a genuine 
entrepreneurship in this sector. 
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In addition, lack of access to credit and infrastructure facilities are other major constraints in 
the development of the private sector. Also no significant reforms in land ownership are 
impeding the introduction of modern mechanization. 
These main constraints impeding private sector led development in this sector are discussed 
below. 
Lack of Good Governance 
Among the six good governance indicators, the results of the study suggest that the lack of the 
following indicators have contributed to the problem of low corporate social responsibility in 
this sector associated with the sale of low quality underweight inputs at higher prices. 
Control of Corruption: In Bangladesh corruption not only has negative effects on economic 
growth but also has far reaching social, political and ethical implications. As the indicators of 
governance are mutually reinforcing and supporting, lack of effective regulatory quality, 
accountability and rule of law have been the main impediments to the control of corruption. 
The lack of control of corruption in Bangladesh leads to lack of rule of law, government 
effectiveness, and accountability which in turn undermine regulatory quality, thus 
contributing to a vicious cycle of poor governance. 
According to Khan, Bangladesh is characterized by a patron-client network where state 
officials as patrons within these networks lack the power to enforce and protect rights and 
propelty. This gives rise to different clientelist groups who then organize their own challenges 
on rights which have important implications for breeding corruption (Khan, 2000). 
According to World Bank (2005), this type of patron-client relationship presents myriad 
opportunities for granting benefits to and redistributing resources towards favoured groups. In 
Bangladesh this has resulted in weak enforcement of sanctions, the poor functioning of the 
judiciary and the legal system impeding fairness in the functioning of society. Although there 
have been significant efforts to combat corruption and improve governance at national and 
international level, much still remains to be done. 
Regulatory Quality: In order to be socially responsible, business needs a stable and strong 
regulatory framework, which enforces compliance with the standards affecting both the 
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quality and fair trading. Minogue (2002) argues that although regulation involves a simple 
set of questions i.e. what are the institutions of rule making, who are rule makers, how rules 
are implemented and by whom and the forms that compliance and accountability take but in 
relation to the governance and policy processes of most developing countries these are 
questions to which there is frequently no clear answers. This stands true for Bangladesh 
agriculture sector as most of the farmers and even the private traders are not aware of the 
existing rules and sanctions enforcing compliance. 
There are regulatory frameworks for agricultural inputs. The legal and regulatory 
arrangements as specified in Fertilizer, Seeds and Pesticides Ordinance spell out penalty and 
fines for misbranding and selling adulterated inputs. The regulatory framework includes 
functioning of monitoring committees at both national and local level with elected 
representatives to monitor the distribution of agricultural inputs. Despite these regulatory 
arrangements, there are incidences of the sale of low quality underweight inputs which 
indicate that the regulatory steps taken by the government are not working adequately. 
Sanctions which playa vital role to encourage, enforce and underpin compliance where the 
informal mechanisms are not adequate, are not being effectively implemented as private 
entrepreneurs are able to circumvent them through irregular, illegal payments ( Azmat and 
Coghill, 2005). The effective enforcement of sanctions is also being compromised by the 
failure of capacity building by government agencies which are inadequate to perform the 
random quality checking of the inputs. Findings of this study suggest that lack of capacity 
building on the part of the state is one of the major factors that are contributing to the weak 
regulatory quality. The lack of capacity is mainly due to lack of adequate fund, trained staff, 
equipment and infrastructure. In addition, public officials are poorly paid, they do not have 
any incentive and are not motivated to carryon their jobs efficiently. 
With the recent advancement in technology and globalization, there is an urgent need to 
review the existing rules and legislations to eliminate confusion between various regulatory 
authorities, clear delineation of responsibilities and also to make rules up to date, simple and 
consistent with recent developments. In some cases, the fines and punishments for adulteration 
and misbranding which were consistent with the time period in which they were enacted have 
become nominal and non significant in the present context and need to be reviewed to provide 
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disincentives for any socially irresponsible behaviour. The present environment therefore 
offers opportunities for businesses to behave unethically. 
Rule of Law: According to Kaufmann, Kraay & Lobaton (2003), rule of law is the extent to 
which people have confidence in and abide by rules. These include the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. Due to the close link 
between good governance indicators, the establishment of accountability is critically 
important for the establishment of the rule of law and also for controlling corruption. Findings 
from this exploratory study suggest that in Bangladesh, the lack of the proper enforcement of 
the rules and regulations, and unpredictability of judiciary is a major problem in doing 
business/ farming. This reflects the fact that people do not have much confidence in nor do 
they want to abide by rules, mainly due to lack of accountability and prevalence of corruption. 
Also the weak policing enables extOltionists to increase the cost of doing business. Sbragia 
(2000) argues that the rule of law and well defined legal and judicial mechanism for resolving 
conflicts among parties are essential for a market economy. Bangladesh unfortunately does 
not have an effective and strong judiciary and the enforceability of contracts is a problem. The 
efficiency of the legal environment is further decreased as the courts are understaffed lacking 
basic infrastructure necessities i.e. telephone, email which lead to delays and backlogs. In 
addition to the integrity of the lower courts which is in question, for common people justice 
system is hardly accessible and affordable (Del war, 2005). 
As the indicators of governance are mutually reinforcing and suppOltive effective regulation, 
cannot be enforced without accountability, rule of law and control of corruption. The lack of 
these governance indicators are contributing to low levels of corporate social responsibility in 
Bangladesh. 
Integrated Market Structure 
The reforms in the input sector have focused only on the supply side without considering all 
the market forces. While there have been significant changes in the input supply system, the 
outbound side of market mechanisms remains unchanged. The market operates via a well 
synchronized value chain, increasing efficiency and creating value output for the owners. 
However, the structure of the agricultural market remains fragmented with many actors and is 
dominated by intermediaries. Institutions have not been created and the existing regulatory 
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framework has not been effective in ensuring the quality of the inputs. As mentioned, the 
capacity of the state agencies to monitor and regulate remains severely constrained due to lack 
of funds, skilled human resources and logistics. 
Although agricultural production has increased significantly, it has not benefited the farmers. 
The farmers do not have adequate access to market information and also to the market to sell 
their produces. Mostly they have to rely on middlemen to sell the produce from their farms or 
homes without going to the market. Although the role of the middlemen in the present context 
remains indispensable as they compensate for the transport problems faced by the farmers, it is 
now well established that they not only exploit the farmers but also the consumers with higher 
prices (Agriculture Sector Review, 2004). Mostly farmers do not have the bargaining or 
negotiating power as they do not have any organised association / cooperative for marketing 
their produce. This explains the large differential between farm gate prices and 
wholesale/retail prices(Agriculture Sector Review, 2004). As there has not been any 
significant improvement in the well-being of the farmers nor savings to be invested in large 
scale agricultural production, elaborate market mechanisms have not emerged. 
Market Information 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that in emerging markets, buyers and seller usually suffer 
from a severe dearth of information for three reasons: underdeveloped communications 
infrastructure; usually no mechanism to confirm the claim made by the sellers; and finally, 
consumers do not have a redress mechanism. This particularly applies in the case of 
Bangladesh. Misleading information and lack of access to market information by both the 
farmers and traders on price trends, the poorly developed transport system, the behaviour of 
middlemen, no consumer-information organization and a poorly functioning redress 
mechanism - all these are creating an unfavourable system for both the farmers and traders, 
preventing them from realizing the benefits of the reforms. 
According to the Pacific Council on International Policy (2002), in developing countries 
where problems of low connectivity and human resource development (including low ICT 
literacy) are severe, creativity and careful planning can develop specific applications, services 
and information that can be delivered in a targeted, useful way to identifiable audiences. It is 
also argued the emergence of very low cost wireless networks and access devices can help 
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bridge infrastructure gaps in rural areas, linking the informal economy to established markets 
and providing distribution channels and transaction platforms (Prahalad and Hammond, 
2003). Although the telecom and ICT facilities in Bangladesh remain poor, the "Village 
Phone", concept developed jointly by Orameen Telecom & Orameen Bank- has proved to be 
extremely successful not only in linking the rural population with the rest of the world but 
also in having a positive socio-economic impact. With the existing mobile technology 
successfully introduced in Bangladesh and non internet aspects i.e. radio and TV, Bangladesh 
can start with pilot e-projects of village kiosks to provide access to market information, with 
the help of NOOs, the private sector and the donors and based on its success, this project can 
be replicated in other districts. 
Lack of Awareness 
Market-based reforms in the agriculture sector have resulted in the emergence of many small 
traders who are involved with the trading of agricultural inputs. Most of them have no 
previous experience, lack expertise and are not efficient and competent enough to take 
advantage of the open economy. In most cases they are not aware of the importance of 
building a good reputation, positive image and trusted relationship with the farmers - essential 
for their profitability and survival in the long term. They seem to have a primary focus on 
earning profits in the short term, ignoring the issue of responsible behaviour. The business 
environment with the absence of weak regulatory sanctions, poor institutional safeguards and 
prevalence of corruption doesn't constrain them from behaving irresponsibly. 
Bhattacharya and Shankar (2004) argue that consumers are important stakeholder groups who 
are susceptible to a company's CSR initiatives and this positive link to consumer patronage is 
spurring companies to be more socially responsible. Like in other developing countries the 
consumer pressure is weak in Bangladesh and is even weaker in the agriculture sector which 
is predominantly associated with small, poor and semi-illiterate farmers who are not even 
aware of their rights. In many cases, the farmers are ignorant of the redress process and even 
if they are aware, they find it to be complex, time consuming and expensive. Also there seems 
to be a lack of an organised forum through which farmers could take up these issues. Civil 
society, particularly the NOOs, can contribute to the visibility of CSR, and increase farmers' 
and societal awareness and expectations. Although the media has been active as a watchdog, 
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there is a need to further expose the wrongdoings of both the public and private sectors, build 
awareness among consumers and create pressure for resolving the issues related to CSR. 
As the reforms were only focused on supply side they have not been able to create an 
integrated market structure. Although agricultural production has increased it has failed to 
have a significant impact on the well-being and savings of the farmers required for investing 
in large scale production. The access to market is not easy for the farmers which has made the 
intermediaries or the 'middle men' very important. This problem is fmther compounded by the 
lack of market information and lack of awareness among the farmers. The reforms have 
increased the access to inputs but ensuring their quality, weight and price in some cases has 
emerged as a problem. In the absence of effective regulatory mechanisms, rule of law and 
prevalence of corruption the private traders feel less constrained to abide by law and engage in 
unethical practices. There also seems to be lack of awareness among the private sector 
regarding the importance of responsible business practices to create a relationship of trust 
between the stakeholders for their long term benefit. In addition, there are problems like lack 
of credit, market information, complementary role of the government and all these factors 
have been responsible for the lack of development of genuine private entrepreneurship. 
CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE MODEL: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO A 
SUSTAINABLE PRIVATE SECTOR LED DEVELOPMENT? 
As shown in Figure 1, the model proposes an integrated pmticipatory approach between the 
three key spheres of governance i.e. the state, the private sector and civil society. In addition, 
the model also includes the donor agencies as one of the key actors. The role of the donors 
in influencing domestic policies through conditionality remains significant despite the fact 
that the share of external aid in development programs has been declining. In addition to 
advocating a market oriented approach, the donors have also involved themselves with the 
prime objective of improving governance issues and creating an enabling environment 
conducive to private sector led development. The donor agencies have also increasingly 
become involved with pmtnerships with various NGOs to channel their funds to deliver 
goods and services to the target population. The preference for NGOs as pmtners is also due 
to the realization that compared to the private sector and the state, NGOs are in a better 
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position to possess local knowledge, address rural poverty, understand local needs and 
priorities, and practice consultative management (Huque, 2004). 
Although the market-based reforms have been ongoing for about three decades, the private 
sector and the state have been seen as adversarial forces until recently. The findings of the 
study show that there remains a support for the involvement of the state in various activities 
by the general population. This anti-market bias can be explained by the long and strong 
tradition of state authority and administration, the failure of the state to fully delegate 
authority, and also the irresponsible business practices of the private sector that have failed to 
create a positive image as a substitute of the state. 
Civil society m Bangladesh is emergmg. In addition to the world renowned NGOs like 
Grameen Bank, BRAC, the media is becoming increasingly effective in exposing corrupt acts, 
creating public opinion and awareness. The independent think tanks and academics are also 
playing a contributory and advocacy role in the development of policies. The NGOs have 
been successful in creating the necessary platform for targeting the poor population through 
their various micro-credit and poverty alleviation programs, which has been not possible on 
the part of the state. Despite the fact that Bangladeshi NGOs are portrayed as success stories 
and are used as models or exemplars for other countries, it is argued that the government-
NGO partnership to enhance human development and social empowerment in rural areas has 
not been effective enough to achieve its goals (Huque, 2004). The challenge for the 
government therefore is to rethink the partnership, overcome its drawbacks and take 
advantage of their platform for effective service delivery. 
The private sector has not been able to develop as genuine entrepreneurs due to the constraints 
which mainly centre on governance issues. The market in the agriculture sector remains 
fragmented. The farmers are not organized enough to create pressure, negotiate or bargain. 
The development of the private sector is also constrained due to their lack of awareness and 
market information. 
Keeping the main constraints of private sector development in view, the main purpose of the 
integrated model is to improve governance issues through establishing a citizens charter, 
providing market information, capacity and awareness building. As the top down 
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bureaucratic approach has failed, the model proposes a bottom up approach involving all the 
stakeholders. Rather than working separately the model proposes the key players to have an 
integrated partnership arrangement to complement each other. The following section 
discusses how the key players can act in an integrated partnership arrangement to provide 
citizens charter, market information and capacity bUilding. 
Citizens Charter 
The citizens charter which was first introduced in UK in 1991 had the main objectives of 
improving service quality, to make the public sector accountable and also allow the citizens 
the opportunity to complain. As the charter has been successful in its objectives, both the 
developed (France, Canada) and developing countries (India, Malaysia) have established 
citizens charters in line of the British model under different names butr essentially the same 
purpose. The model in Figure 1 proposes the establishment of a Citizens' charter in 
Bangladesh for greater responsiveness, quality and effectiveness of services. 
Seminars or workshops could be organized jointly by the state, the private sector and civil 
society to bring all the stakeholders i.e. the farmers, the traders, the state agencies, NGOs on 
the same platform, to have a dialogue and reach a consensus on the measurable standards of 
services provided by different actors. Based on consensus, a citizens' charter could be 
established with the details of services provided by each of the actors, how to obtain the 
service, consumer grievances, redress mechanisms in case of services not meeting the 
expectations, and the information about the performance of each actor/ partners. The 
government could review the existing rules and laws to make it more up-to-date and simple 
so that they are understood by all. An independent regulatory body can act as a watchdog to 
effectively enforce and monitor the functioning of the charter. The regulatory body needs to 
be an independent entity and maintain an arms length with state agencies to avoid conflict of 
interest. Although it is challenging, Bangladesh has recently started to have these 
independent regulatory bodies i.e. anti-corruption commission, Bangladesh telecom, etc .. 
As the setting up of an independent regulatory entity is time consuming, key actors can be 
designated to act as watchdogs in the transition period and provide a system of checks and 
balances to expose any acts of corruption, wrongdoings, and incidents relating to the failure 
to enforce sanctions, demanding transparency and establishing rule of law. However to be 
effective, this system of checks and balances needs to have a sincere commitment from the 
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political leadership and also from the private sector and civil society. As the citizens' charter 
is a new concept, the state, the media and the NGOs could work together an awareness 
campaign for its wide publicity through leaflets, banners, posters and information seminars. 
There is also a need for the proper training and orientation of the employees responsible for 
the implementation of the charter. 
The proper implementation of the citizens' charter will have a multitude of effects: i) it will 
promote transparency, accountability and responsiveness of the agencies providing services to 
the farmers and other consumers, ii) provide simple redress mechanisms to deal with 
complaints, iii) positive impact on controlling corruption and effective regulation iv) establish 
a trusted relationship between the service provider and its users and iv) finally it will lead to 
empowerment and awareness for both service providers and users through improved access to 
information 
Market Information 
The lack of access to market information has been one of the major factors that are impeding 
the development of the private sector. Although Bangladesh lacks the necessary 
technological, infrastructural, legal and human capacities, it can still introduce e-government 
practices tailored to suit the needs of the rural characteristics of low level of illiteracy, low 
buying power, inadequate infrastructure, power and telecommunication by re-engineering the 
existing infrastructure rather than waiting for massive investments and perfect technological 
advancements. The state with the help of the private sector, NGOs and donors could take up 
practical steps to increase access to market information by setting up pilot e-projects in each 
village through non internet aspects as, mobiles, TV and radio as to provide i). commodity 
marketing information service i.e. prices, quality and quantity requirement in surrounding 
areas ii). extension services/ advices, like use of pesticides, fertilizers, seeds, new technology, 
advice on farming best practices iii) weather information iv) services information- the 
availability of services in the area i.e. credit facilities, labour supply and demand and v). 
public grievances redress regarding complaints for substandard inputs, crisis or price hikes of 
inputs. 
Figure 1: Proposed Integrated Governance Model for Sustainable Private sector Led 
Development. 
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Setting up a project like this could complement the citizens' charter, having multitude 
advantages. It would not only help the farmers to bypass intermediaries, deal directly with end 
users and get better sale prices of their products, it could also ensure their access to extension 
services regarding the use of inputs and new technologies. The farmers could also get 
information on credit & other related services available in that area, file complaints for poor 
quality inputs, price hikes etc. The access to information about market conditions, available 
extension and other services, weather conditions, would all lead towards a more informed 
decision making, empowerment of the farmers and help make the private traders accountable 
to their stakeholders. This would ultimately help in the creation of an integrated market 
structure. 
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Capacity & Awareness Building 
The capacity of the state to undertake the responsibilities of effective monitoring remains 
severely constrained due to lack of funds, trained human resources and logistics. Findings of 
this study have also indicated that in most of the cases the capacity of the private sector is also 
severely constrained in terms of lack of access to funds, necessary infrastructural facilities to 
undertake investment. This is the area where NOOs and the donor agencies can provide 
assistance to both state agencies and the private sector with training, resources and 
infrastructure facilities. The donors could playa significant role to help build the regulatory and 
institutional capacities of the state, civil society and the private sector in terms of providing 
them with training, access to information and resources. In addition, the donors also need to be 
more actively involved in the development of infrastructure facilities. This capacity building 
would lead to more effective monitoring and regulatory capacity of the state. 
The NOOs could share much of the role of the state in providing training to the private 
sector and farmers about the role of the citizens' charter, business ethics, responsible 
business practices and initiating awareness campaign against conuption and the need to 
comply with law. The NOOs could also serve as advocates for the poor farmers who are 
being cheated and have no power or voice and help in enforcement of the rules and 
regulations which are already in place. Although the state, the private sector and NOOs are 
working together in making credit more accessible to the farmers and the private traders, this 
needs to be more coordinated and done on a larger scale. 
The partnership and relationship between state, market and civil society needs to be 
complementary. Kernaghan (2005) argues that the culture in public organizations tends to 
focus on accountability upwards rather than on the hOlizontal thinking and commitment that 
are required for effective integrated service delivery. Finding of this study have indicated that 
the role of the state in complementing the private sector needs to be more facilitative. 
Therefore there is a need to change the organizational culture of the state agencies to make 
them more participative, cooperative and information sharing. The donor agencies and the 
NOOs can play an effective role in the capacity building of the state through providing 
training and resources. 
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In addition, the donor agencies can also play a role in promoting good govemance by 
pursuing greater transparency, accountability, control of corruption and establishment of the 
rule of law. Hodge (2004), argues that both the World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
have not included actions for improving accountability and have made little formal reference 
to reducing the effects of corruption in their respective Private Sector Strategies (PSD) for 
developing countries. In the same time there also seems to be a need for the donors to be 
more transparent and accountable themselves, as institutions such as World Bank and ADB 
are now regularly accused of being secretive, unaccountable and ineffective (Woods, 2001). 
The proposed integrated model of establishing citizens' charter, providing market 
information, capacity and awareness building needs to have a coordinated effort and 
commitment of all the main players including the donors. The role of all the players are 
crucial in the effective implementation of the model, leading to improved govemance and 
creating a business environment supporting a sustainable private sector led development in 
this sector. 
CONCLUSION 
Bangladesh has been attempting market-oriented development approaches for more than three 
decades. The reforms have been successful to some extent but they have not lived up to their 
expectations. This paper has examined the changes in the role of the govemment and the main 
constraints on private sector led development following the market-based reforms in the 
agriculture sector. Lack of: good govemance; creation of an integrated market structure; access 
to market information; capacity and awareness building, have been the major constraints on the 
development of the private sector. In addition, the lack of credit and infrastructure facilities and 
failure to take significant land reforms are other constraints. 
The paper proposes an integrated govemance model linking state, private sector and civil 
society as a possible solution for the constraints faced by the private sector. The integrated and 
participatory relationship between the key players could improve govemance issues by 
establishing a citizens' charter, providing market information, capacity and awareness building. 
In addition to the state, the private sector and civil society, the model also stresses the need for 
the donors to help build capacity of all the three spheres of govemance and also in improving 
govemance issues. We argue that unless the issues of govemance, access to market 
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information, creation of awareness and capacity building of the three spheres are addressed, a 
sustainable private sector led development will remain a far cry. A functional governance 
model is required in Bangladesh that engages the state, civil society and the private sector to 
work together effectively and co-operatively in a participatory approach. 
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